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SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATION IMPROPERLY ADMITTED
TO PROVE AGENCY
When a statement is uttered out-of-court by a person not under
oath and not subject to cross-examination, the hearsay rule of evi-
dence forbids the use of such an extrajudicial statement to prove the
truth of the matter contained therein.' "Hearsay is excluded because
of potential infiraities with respect to the observation, memory, nar-
ration, and veracity of him who utters the offered words when not
under oath and subject to cross-examination."
2
The effect of the various exceptions3 to the hearsay rule is to per-
mit out-of-court statements to be repeated in court by either the
person who heard the utterance or by the "declarant himself and to be
admitted in evidence to prove the truth of the matter stated, irres-
pective of the fact that the speaker was neither under oath nor sub-
ject to cross-examination when the statement was uttered. For instance,
if immediately after an automobile accident involving A and B, A
were to tell B that "I was in a hurry to get home," this assertion would
be hearsay when repeated by B in court, because A, the declarant,
was not under oath and not subject to cross-examination when he
uttered the statement; but it would nevertheless be admissible in
evidence against A, in an action for negligence, under the spontaneous
exclamation (excited utterance)4 exception to the hearsay rule.5 This
exception, like all exceptions to the hearsay rule, is based upon two
general principles:. (1) that some special necessity exists for resorting
15 Wigmore, Evidence § 1361-62 (3 d ed. 1940). The word "statement" has been
defined as follows: "'Statement' means not only an oral or written expression but
also non-verbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for words
it) expressng the matter stated." Uniform Rule of Evidence 62(1) (1953).
2Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 541 (1946).
3For an enumeration of thirty-one exceptions to the hearsay rule, see the Uni-
form Rule of Evidence 63 (1953).
'For purposes of this comment, the terms "spontaneous exclamation" and "ex-
citedj utterance" will be used interchangeably. The writer prefers not to use the
term "spontaneous declaration" because of its variegated applications. For example,
one writer, divides his discussion of "spontaneous declarations" into six separate
topics: (i) declarations of bodily condition, (2) declarations of mental state, (3)
excited utterances, (4) declarations of-present sense impressions, (5) res gestae, and
(6) self-serving declarations. McCormick, Evidence 561 (1954).
6The same statement would also be admissible in evidence against the de-
clarant under the admission exception to the hearsay rule. See note 22 infra and ac-
companying text.
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to the hearsay statement,6 and (2) that the statement must have been
uttered under circumstances calculated to give some special trust-
worthiness to it, thereby justifying its immunity from the usual test
of cross-examination.
7
Considering these two principles with reference to the stated
hypothetical, there is a "special necessity" for admission of the state-
ment because the declarant of the hearsay utterance, later a party to an
action for negligence, would not want to testify on the witness stand
that he had been in a hurry to get home. In considering the principle
of special necessity as applied to the spontaneous exclamation ex-
ception, Wigmore observes: "The extrajudicial assertion being better
than is likely to be obtained from the same person upon the stand,
a necessity or expediency arises for resorting to it."s A more compre-
hensive analysis of the stated hypothetical is necessary to illustrate
the second principle of "special trustworthiness" as applicable to the
spontaneous exclamation exception: (i) the automobile collision
created a startling occurrence; (2) the declarant's statement that he was
in a hurry to get home was prompted by the exciting occurrence and
was dominated by the nervous excitement therefrom, before the
speaker had time to reflect; and (3) the statement that he was driving
hurriedly threw light upon the collision. These three circumstances
are the bases of the spontaneous exclamation exception to the hear-
say rule.9 The factor of special reliability is thought to be furnished
by the excitement that suspends the powers of reflection and fabrica-
tion.10 Thus, in effect, the excitement of the moment adds an in-
05 Wigmore, Evidence § 1421 (3d ed. 194o).
'Id. § 1422.
86 id. § 1748.
9 Vilcox v. Berry, 32 Cal. 2d x8g, 184 P.2d 939, 94o-41 (1947); Perry v. Haritos,
oo Conn. 476, 124 Ad. 44, 47 (1924); Roushar v. Dixon, 231 Iowa 993, 2 N.W.2d 66o,
662 (1942); Sexton v. Balinski, 28o Mich. 28, 273 N.W. 335, 336 (1937); Potter v.
Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 14o, 145 (1955); 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 175o
(3d ed. 1940).
2McCormick, Evidence 579 (1954). The following passage has been quoted
by the courts [Perry v. Haritos, 1oo Conn. 476, 124 Adl. 44, 47 (1924); State v.
McLaughlin, 138 La. 958, 70 So. 925, 927 (1916)] as a basis for finding the element
of trustworthiness in a spontaneous exclamation: "This general principle is based
on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a
stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties
and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous
and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by
the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and un-
controlled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considera-
tions of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned re-
flection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as
CASE COMMENTS
gredient of trustworthiness to an otherwise inadmissible extrajudicial
statement and removes the barrier to its admission in evidence before
the jury."
A factual pattern similar to that of the hypothetical was involved
in Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball.1 2 The plaintiff, a minor, was
injured when struck by a passenger car owned and operated by the
defendant's employee. The plaintiff's mother testified that imme-
diately after the injury and at the scene of the accident the de-
fendant's employee "told me ... he had to call on a customer and
was in a bit of a hurry to get home."'13 The trial court held that the
alleged extrajudicial statement was admissible to show that the em-
ployee was in fact engaged in his employer's business at the time of
the collision with the minor plaintiff, since such statement had been
an excited utterance. The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit unanimously affirmed the holding of the trial court.
In the previous analysis of the stated hypothetical it was ex-
plained that the extrajudicial statement of anxiety to get home could
have been admitted in court under the spontaneous exclamation rule
in an action for negligence against the declarant. Moreover, in the
principal case had the driver stated immediately after and at the
lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real
tenor of the speaker's belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore
be received as testimony to those facts." 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1747 (3 d ed.
1940).
"The validity of the spontaneous exclamation exception has been questioned
on the grounds that emotion often prevents the perception from being reliable.
Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 5, 8 (1924). The following
passage, to be compared with the quotation from Wigmore in note 1o supra,
cogently illustrates the psychological attack on the reliability of spontaneous ex-
clamations: "One need 'not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made under
emotional stress; everybody accepts such statements with mental reservation. M.
Gorphe cites the case of an excited witness to a horrible accident who erroneously
declared that the coachman deliberately and vindictively ran down a helpless
.woman. Fiore tells of an emotionally upset man who testified that hundreds were
killed in afd accident;. that he had seen their heads rolling from their bodies. In
reality only one man was killed, and five others injured. Another excited gentle-
man took a pipe for a pistol. Besides these stories from real life, there are psy-
chological experiments which point to the same conclusion. After a battle in a
classroom, prearranged by the experimenter but a surprise to the students, each
one was asked to write an account of the incident. The testimony of the most up-
set students was practically worthless, while those who were only slightly stimulated
emotionally scored better than those left cold by the incident." Hutchins and
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 432, 437
(1928) (footnote references omitted).
"249 F.9d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
2Id. at 509.
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scene of the accident only that he had been in a hurry to get home,
such a statement would have been admissible in evidence, under
the same exception to the hearsay rule, against the employer in an
action for negligence-assuming that both the fact of employment
and course of employment had been proved by independent evidence.
In other words, unlike the vicarious admission rule which will be
discussed later, it is immaterial in passing upon the admissibility of
spontaneous exclamations that an agency relationship exists between
the speaker and a party to the trial.
14
It is to be emphasized, however, that the purpose for admitting
the out-of-court assertion in the principal case (that declarant had
to call on a customer and was in a hurry to get home) was to prove
the fact of course of employment. The action for personal injury was
against the declarant's employer and not against the employee; except
for the hearsay statement there was no independent evidence to prove
that the owner and driver of the car was in the course of his employ-
ment at the time of the injury, because the collision took place at
6:30 p.m., one and one-half hours after the regular work day had
terminated.
On its face, the principal case appears to be contrary to an over-
whelming weight of authority which holds that the, out-of-court
declaration of an agent is not admissible in court against his em-
ployer to prove either the fact of agency or course of employment.15
But this majority proposition is limited to the vicarious admission
exception to the hearsay rule which must be analyzed in terms of
the principal case to distinguish it properly from the spontaneous
exclamation exception. Under the vicarious admission exception,
assuming that both the fact of agency and course of employment have
been established by independent evidence, extrajudicial admissions
of an agent, who is authorized to make statements concerning the
116 Wigmore, Evidence § 1756(a) (3d ed. 1940). Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391, 405
(1938). See quote from Tiffany in note 23 infra.
"American Nat. Bank v. Bartlett, 40 F.2d 21, 23 (ioth Cir. 1930); Commercial
Solvents v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 237, 69 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1952); 4 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1o78 (3d ed. 194o); McCormick, Evidence 519 & n.14 (1954). Restatement (Second),
Agency § 285 (1958); 2o Am. Jur. Evidence § 597 (1939). For an exhaustive collec-
tion of cases see Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 6o2 (1950).
It must be remembered, however, that the majority rule does not preclude an
alleged agent from testifying in court to the fact of agency or course of employ-
ment because such testimony would not be offered as a vicarious admission. Shama
v. United States, 94 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1938); Daly v. Williams, 78 Ariz. 382, 28o
P.2d 701, 703-04 (1955); Wilson v. Savino, 1o N.J. 11, 89 A.2d 399, 402 (1952); Mid-
land Credit Co. v. White, 175 Pa. Super. 314, 1o4 A.2d 350, 352 (1954); 4 Wigmore,
Evidence § o78 & n.8 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence 519 (1954).
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subject matter of the utterance, are admissible in evidence against
the principal16 on the theory that the identity of interests between
a principal and his agent is a sufficient guarantee of the reliability of
such statement as evidence.17 For example, if A is employed as an
agent to make out-of-court settlements of automobile claims against
his insurance company and in performance of this employment makes
an admission that acknowledges the carelessness of his insured in an
automobile accident, it is evident that such an admission was uttered
during A's employment and within the scope of his authority. Con-
sequently, A's admission could be used in court as evidence against
the insurance company, having satisfied the requirements of the
vicarious admission exception. However, the utterance by the defen-
dant's employee in the Ball case, that he-had to call on a customer
and was in a bit of a hurry to get home, would not satisfy the vicarious
admission exception for two reasons. Firstly, there was no indepen-
dent evidence introduced to prove that the einployee had any authority
whatsoever to call on customers after the termination of the work day;
without such evidence the fact of course of employment could not
be proved. With this in mind Wigmore explains "that the fact of
agency [or course of employment] must of course be somehow evi-
denced before the alleged agent's declarations can be received as
admissions; and therefore the use of the alleged agent's hearsay
assertions that he is agent would for that purpose be inadmissible,
as merely begging the very question."' 8 Secondly, even assuming that
course of employment had been proved by independent evidence, the
employee's statement as to his anxiety to get home would not satisfy
the prevailing view that for a vicarious admission to be admitted in
evidence against the principal, the agent must have had authority
to make statements concerning the subject matter of the utterance. 19
"United States v. United Show Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Mass.
i95o); Friedman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 3o N.W.gd 752, 759 (1948); Sacks v.
Martin Equip. Corp., '333 Mass. 274, 13o N.E.2d 547, 550 (1955); Restatement
(Second), Agency § 286 (1958). But cf. note 20 infra.
1747 Colum. L. Rev. 1227, 1228 (z947). Another basis for reliance on the extra-
judicial statements of a "speaking-agent" has been suggested: "Such reports, when
of facts within the reporter's knowledge, are likely to have a high degree of trust-
worthiness as to matters of advantage to the opponent. They are usually the result
of careful investigation by a person whose duty demands accurate observation and
narration; they are not likely to contain false statements disserving to the master.
Thus they stand on the same basis as most other entries in the course of business
and duty." Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 461,
n4 (x929).
14 Wigmore, Evidence § 1o78 (3d ed. 194o). Accord, 2 Jones, Evidence 1748 (1926).
uSee note 16 supra.
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In other words, under the prevailing view, the employee is the agent
of the principal only for the purpose of operating the vehicle and
not for the purpose of making statements concerning its mode of
operation.
20
From the previous discussion it is evident that the vicarious ad-
mission rule and the spontaneous exclamation rule are based upon
two distinct and unrelated principles. The vicarious admission ex-
ception is derived from the substantive rule of agency that an agent
may bind his principal when he has authority to speak, for the utter-
ance becomes that of the principal. 21 Superimposed upon this rule
of agency is the admission rule of evidence that a person's own hear-
say may be used against him. This exception to the hearsay rule is
based upon the theory that a party, having made a statement which
by chance operates against his interest at the time of the trial, can-
not object to its reception as evidence for the reason that he has the
full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former
assertion. 22 The spontaneous exclamation exception, on the other
hand, is not dependent upon any rule of agency; rather it is purely a
rule of evidence and is just as applicable in a proper case to one who
was not an agent as to one who was an agent.23 "The theory is that
"Assuming that both the fact of agency and course of employment have been
established by independent evidence, there is a minority trend, embodied in the
Model Code of Evidence rule 5o8(a) (1942) and in the Uniform Rule of Evidence
63(9)(a) (1953), which permits extrajudicial statements of an agent, whether
authorized or not, to be admitted in evidence against the principal if naturally
made in the course of the agency and before the termination thereof. Silfka v.
Johnson, 161 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1947); Whitaker v. Keogh, x44 Neb. 79 o , 14
N.W.2d 596, 6oo (1944); 4 Wignsore, Evidence § 1o78 (3d ed. 194o); McCormick,
Evidence 58o (1954).
'Restatement (Second), Agency § 286 (1958).
"2 Wigmore, Evidence § 1o48 (3d ed. 194o). A second theory underlying the ad-
mission exception is one of estoppel: once a person has said something, he is then
estopped to deny, in a subsequent trial, having made his former assertion. 37 Ky.
L.J. 417, 421 (1949)-
It is necessary to emphasize that the admission exception must be distinguished
from the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule. The admission
exception permits in evidence the out-of-court statement of a party opponent
whether or not the utterance was against his interest when made. Morgan, Admis-
sions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 3o Yale L.J. 355, 358-59 (1921). For
additional distinctions between the two exceptions see 4 Wigmore, Evidence § io49
(3d ed. 1940).
212 Mechem, Agency § 1793 (1914). For examples of one judge who was par-
ticularly mindful of the distinction between vicarious admissions and excited ut-
terances see Chantry v. Pettit Motor Co., 156 S.C. 1, 152 S.E. 753 (1930) (dissenting
opinion) and Snipes v. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Elec. Corp., 151 S.C. 391, 149 S.E. Mi
(1929) (dissenting opinion). The following passage from a treatise clearly distin-
guishes the two rules: "On the one hand, declarations made at the time of the act
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by the parties participating therein and part of the res gestae-that is, of the sur-
rounding circumstances-are admissible, irrespective of whether the participants
are servants of the person sought to be held responsible for the act, and by whom-
soever made. On the other hand, the statement of a servant or agent is admissible
as an admission,-if it is made when he is engaged in some authorized transaction,
and it is within the scope of his authority in that transaction to make the statement.
To illustrate: In an action against a railway company, by a person injured by a
collision, the declaration of the engineer, referring directly to and characterizing
or explaining the occurrence, made at the time or immediately afterwards, under
its immediate influence, may, under the circumstances of the case, be held part of
the res gestae, and admissible against the company upon that ground. It might be,
however, that some subsequent statement of the engineer as to the cause of the
accident, although not part of the res gestae, would be evidence against the com-
pany as an admission, as, for example, if it happened to be made by him in the
course of his duty in making a report of the accident to a superior officer. In the
one case the declaration of the engineer is admissible as a circumstantial fact, as
part of the res gestae, because it is the spontaneous utterance of a participant in
the event. In the other case his statement is admissible against the company as
an admission, because it is made at a time and under circumstances when the
engineer has authority to make it. If the statement is not admissible, either as a
declaration forming part of the res gestae, or as an admission, it cannot be received."
Tiffany, Agency § 1o6 (1924) (footnote references omitted).
The above passage also illustrates the commingling of the phrases "spontaneous
exclamation" and "res gestae." Whenever an utterance qualifies as a spontaneous
exclamation, it is admissible in evidence under that exception to the hearsay rule;
and any reference to the term "res gestae" is not only confusing but superfluous. As
Wigmore explains: "The phrase 'res gestae' has long been not only entirely useless,
but even positively harmful. It is useless, because every rule of Evidence to which
it has ever been applied exists as a part of some other well-established principle
and can be explained in terms of that principle .... It ought therefore wholly to be
repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phraseology." 6 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1767 (3d ed. i94o). For a sampling of courts confusing the spontaneous exclama-
tion rule by referring to it as "part of the res gestae," see Vicksburg & Meridian R.R.
v. O'Brien, 119 US. 99, io5 (1886) (statement by engineer between ten and thirty
minutes after a railway accident held not admissible as part of res gestae); Foster
v. Pestana, 77 Cal. App. 2d 885, 177 P.2d 54, 57 (1947) (spontaneous exclamation of
foreman, made immediately after accident, was admissible under res gestae rule
against employer and his foreman); Peacock v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 157 Neb.
514, 6o N.W.2d 643, 647 (1953) (statement by driver immediately after an accident
that he was driving too fast held admissible as part of res gestae);Beaule v. Weeks,
95 N.H. 453, 66 A.2d 148, 152 (1953) (statement by truck driver one-half hour after
.accident not admissible as part of res gestae); Rice v. Turner, 191 Va. 6o, 62 S.E.2d
24, 27 (195) (statement made some time after accident held not admissible as part
of res gestae). It may be noted that in each of the cases cited admissibility of the state-
ment turned upon its proximity to the occurrence which provoked it. Consequently,
the courts were in reality analyzing the spontaneous exclamation exception under
the label of "res gestae." Morgan observes: "The marvelous capacity of a Latin
phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the confusion of thought inevitably
accompanying the use of inaccurate terminology, are nowhere better illustrated
than in the decisions dealing with the admissibility of evidence as 'res gestae.' It
is probable that this troublesome expression owes its existence and persistence
in our law of evidence to an inclination of judges and lawyers to avoid the toil-
some exertion of exact analysis and precise thinking." Morgan, A Suggested Classi-
fication of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229 (1922).
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the spontaneous utterances of one who speaks under the excitement
of the moment and before he has had time to deliberate-to concoct
a self favoring story-are likely to be true."
24
With the above distinction between the two rules clearly in mind,
the Ball case analyzed the hearsay statement, that the employee had
to call on a customer and was in a hurry to get home, with reference
to the three usual requirements of the excited utterance exception:
(i) an exciting event; (2) an utterance prompted by the exciting oc-
currence without time to reflect; and (3) an illumination of the ex-
citing event by the utterance.2 5 The court encountered difficulty with
the third requirement because, needless to say, the fact that the em-
ployee previously had to call on a customer no more elucidated
the automobile collision than if the employee had stated that he
had been to the movies and was in a hurry to get home. To over-
come this requirement of "illumination," the court relied heavily
upon the reasoning of Wigmore, to the effect that the third element is
a spurious one,26 and concluded: "The test for receiving the utterance,
therefore, should be whether it meets the first two requirements of a
spontaneous declaration or excited utterance.... In other words,
the very fact that the utterance is not descriptive of the exciting
event is one of the factors which the trial court must take into ac-
count in the evaluation of whether the statement is truly a spontan-
eous, impulsive expression excited by the event." 27 The decision
in the principal case, then, adopted the liberal view advocated by
Wigmore that the essence of the spontaneous exclamation exception
is, as its name implies, the element of spontaneity.2s In emphasizing
this element, the court decided that even though the utterance went
beyond a description of the exciting event and dealt with past facts,
this is merely one of the factors to be considered by the trial judge in
evaluation of whether the statement was spontaneous. In effect, the
court embraced the principle that if the statement is determined by
the trial court to be spontaneous and relevant, then it is admissible
in evidence, irrespective of its subject matter.
29
"2 Mechem, Agency § 1793 (1914).
2See note 9 supra.
'" 2 4 9 F.2d at 511. The court referred to Wigmore's belief that the requirement
that the utterance illuminate the occurrence preceding it has been mistakenly bor-
rowed from the verbal act doctrine. 6 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1752, 1754 (3 d ed.
194o). Unfortunately, however, the court failed to realize that there are situations
where the requirement becomes a real one, even under the analysis of Wigmore.
See especially the text accompanying notes 30, 31, 32 and 33 infra.
"249 F.2d at 511.
215 Wigmore, Evidence § 1749 (3d ed. 194o).21Morgan appears to embrace the same principle: "If spontaneity of itself is
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It is submitted that the Ball case has extended the application
of the spontaneous exclamation rule beyond the permissible bounds
advocated by Wigmore and beyond the scope of sound reasoning.
While it is true that Wigmore states that the third requirement, that
the statement elucidate the exciting event, "is perhaps a cautionary
rather than a logically necessary restriction,"2 0 he later qualifies
himself with the following positive statement: "There is, however,
one aspect in which the limitation becomes a real one; for the mat-
ter to be 'elucidated' is, by hypothesis, the occurrence or act which has
led to the utterance, and not some distinctly separate and prior mat-
ter."3' It is manifest that the part of the utterance of the principal
case, that the employee had to call on a customer, was a reference to
something not directly connected with the accident at all. The fact
that the driver was returning from a "call" does not in any way
emanate from or explain the accident but is rather a reflective nar-
rative of a past event. Surely no one would contend, if the employee
had stated in the principal case that he had been to the movies and
was in a hurry to get home, that the statement relative to the movies
would have had any connection whatsoever with the accident. In like
manner, the statement which is claimed to prove course of employ-
ment relates to a wholly different and distinct transaction from the ac-
cident itself.32 Thus, under Wigmore's analysis of the spontaneous
exclamation rule, the statement could not, by hypothesis, be admit-
ted in evidence irrespective of the fact that it was a spontaneous ut-
terance prompted by an exciting event.33 In discussing the spontaneous
to be accepted as a guaranty of trustworthiness, then the subject matter of the
declaration should not be limited to the startling event which operated to still the re-
flective faculties." Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as
Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 239 (1922).
6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1750(c) (3d ed. 194o).
t lad. § 1754.
wThe following cases have made a similar analysis and have held that such
an utterance as that of the principal case was not admissible to prove agency or
course of employment: Cook v. Hall, 3o8 Ky. 500, 214 S.W.2d 1017, 1o8 (1948);
WVenell v. Shapiro, x94 Minn. 368, 260 N.W. 503, 5o6 (1935); Shepson v. Alhambra
Lounge & Restaurant, Inc., no N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ohio App. 1952); Deater v. Penn.
Mach. Co., 311 Pa. 291, 166 Ad. 846, 847 (1933); Lewis v. J. P. Word Transfer Co.,
119 S.W.2d io6, io8 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). The analysis in the cited cases is weakened,
however, by the insistence of the courts on commingling the terms "spontaneous ex-
clamations" and "res gestae." See the comments following the quotation from
Tiffany in note 23 supra.
31Vigmore offers the following example which is believed to be an excellent
parallel to the utterance of the principal case: "Suppose, for example, an injured
passenger in a railway collision, thinking of his family's condition, exclaims, 'I
hope that my insurance-premium, which I mailed yesterday, has reached the
1959]
